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Reflections on Section 382: Searching for a 
Rationale 
J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. * 
Under federal income tax law, certain corporate acquisitions 
will preserve an unprofitable corporation's net operating loss 
(NOL) carryover. Where the acquisition occurs via an integrated 
taxable transaction, preservation is the general rule if the trans- 
action was (1) an acquisition of stock with the loss corporation 
remaining in existence or (2) an acquisition of assets by the loss 
corporation. Where the acquisition is through a nontaxable trans- 
action, preservation generally occurs if the deal was covered by 
section 381(a)l or if the loss corporation remained in e~is tence.~ 
This list of "preservation" transactions seems to reflect a stable 
consensus as to the types of business acquisitions which should 
permit survival of a corporate NOL carryover; there appears little 
pressure for change. 
But even if a corporate acquisition occurs through a trans- 
action permitting survival of the loss corporation's NOL carry- 
* Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. Mem- 
ber of the Utah and Washington Bars. 
1. I.R.C. 9 381(a) provides: 
(a) GENERAL RULE.-In the case of the acquisition of assets of a corporation 
by another corporation- 
(1) in a distribution to such other corporation to which section 
332 -(relating to liquidations of subsidiaries) applies, except in a case 
in which the basis of the assets distributed is determined under see- 
tion 334(b)(2); or 
(2) in a transfer to which section 361 (relating to nonrecognition 
of gain or loss to corporations) applies, but only if the transfer is in 
connection with a reorganization described in subparagraph (A), (C), 
(D) (but only if the requirements of subparagraphs (A) and (B) of 
section 354(b)(1) are met), or (F) of section 368(a)(1), 
the acquiring corporation shall succeed to and take into account, as of the close 
of the day of distribution or transfer, the items described in subsection (c) of 
the distributor or transferor corporation, subject to the conditions and limita- 
tions specified in subsections (b) and (c). 
The "items described in subsection (c)" include NOL carryovers. 
2. For a more detailed summary of transactions which both do and do not permit 
preservation of corporate NOL carryovers, see B. BIT~KER & J. Eusnc~, FEDERAL INCOME 
TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS A D SHAREHOLDERS 7 16.03 (4th ed. 1979). 
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over as the general rule, can there nevertheless be circumstances 
justifying restrictions on the survival of the carryover in a particu- 
lar case? If so, what are the circumstances and what restrictions 
are justified? There is no settled agreement on these issues. 
This lack of consensus is due largely to the absence of a 
clearly identified governing principle or rationale for use in re- 
solving the issues. For instance, settled answers are lacking for 
several central questions. Is a corporate NOL carryover an asset 
which the owners should be allowed to realize on? If so, who are 
the owners-the shareholders at  the time the loss was sustained, 
shareholders who have newly acquired control, or the corporation 
itself? Is a corporate NOL carryover an income averaging device 
limited to the corporation suffering loss and inherently incapable 
of surviving an asset transfer to another corporation? Should a 
corporate NOL carryover follow the business assets that created 
it? What effect should a change of business or change in share- 
holders have on a corporate NOL ~arryover?~ It is clear from these 
unanswered questions that until basic principles are established 
for determining the extent to which corporate NOL carryovers 
should survive in particular preservation transactions, our tax 
law cannot be structured to deal adequately with this matter. 
Although lacking these basic principles, Congress neverthe- 
less proceeded to. impose detailed and complicated rules in this 
area by the 1954 enactment of section 382.4 These rules were 
3. See generally AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL INCOME, ESTATE AND G I ~  TAX 
PROJECT-FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROBLEMS OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 341-48 
(1958) [hereinafter cited as ALI PROJECT]. 
4. The pre-1976 Tax Reform Act version of 4 382 (Internal Revenue Code of 1954, ch. 
736, 8 382,68A Stat. 3) was principally divided into 4 382(a), dealing with taxable changes 
in corporate ownership and 4 382(b), dealing with tax-free corporate acquisitions. 
[Section 382(a)] provided that where new owners buy 50 percent or more of the 
stock of a loss corporation during a 2-year period, its loss carryovers from prior 
years were allowed in full if the company continued to conduct its prior trade 
or business or substantially the same kind of business. It could add or begin a 
new business, however, and apply loss carryovers incurred by the former owners 
against profits from the new business (unless tax avoidance was the principal 
purpose for the acquisition). If the same business was not continued, however, 
loss carryovers were completely lost. In the case of a tax-free reorganization, loss 
carryovers were allowed on a declining scale (sec. 382(b)). If the former owners 
of the loss company received 20 percent or more of the fair market value of the 
stock of the acquiring company, the loss carryovers were allowed in full. For each 
percentage point less than 20 which the former owners received, the loss carry- 
over was reduced by 5 percentage points. It was immaterial whether the business 
of the loss company was continued after the reorganization (sec. 382(b)). 
STAFF OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 9 4 ~ ~  CONG., 2D SESS., GENERAL EXPLANATION F 
THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976, a t  190 (Comm. Print 1976). It was stated with respect to 
2131 SECTION 382 215 
significantly amended in 1976 with a quantum increase in com- 
p l e ~ i t y , ~  but the effective date has been delayed until 1980 to 
permit further study.6 
Since the degree of survival of corporate NOL carryovers in 
connection with preservation transactions is a current and open 
question, this Article will investigate the rationale that should be 
used in resolving the issue. The investigation will be facilitated 
by a brief look at history and economics. 
In 1909 Congress levied, without apportionment among the 
states, a one percent tax on corporate annual net incomes exceed- 
ing $5000. Perhaps because 1909 fell between the unfortunate 
Pollock decision,' which declared the unapportioned 1894 income 
tax unconstitutional, and the adoption of the sixteenth amend- 
ment, Congress did not openly call the new exaction an income 
tax. Instead, it was styled a "special excise tax with respect to the 
carrying on or doing busine~s."~ Presumably, this terminology 
was used because excises had earlier been classified indirect taxes 
that were exempt from the Constitution's apportionment require- 
ment? 
Confident that this congressional camouflage would be disre- 
garded and that the new levy would be declared an invalid in- 
come tax under Pollock for lack of apportionment, taxpayers 
went to court. The result was Flint v. Stone Tracy Co.,1° which 
held that the tax was "an excise upon the particular privilege of 
doing business in a corporate capacity" and that no apportion- 
ment was required." 
pre-1976 § 382 that "the basic criticism of the present Code provisions regulating transfer- 
ability of loss carryovers is directed to the lack of a uniform underlying principle upon 
which to construct effective statutory provisions." ALI PROJECT, supra note 3, at 341. 
5. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 806 (e), 90 Stat. 1520 (codified at 
I.R.C. 4 382, applicable to tax years beginning after June 30, 1980). For a thorough 
discussion of the new rules, see Eustice, The Tax Reform Act of 1976: Loss Carryovers 
and Other Corporate Changes, 32 TAX L. REV. 113 (1977). 
6. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 368, 92 Stat. 2763. See STAFF OF 
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 9 5 ~ ~  CONG., 2~ SESS., GENERAL EXPLANATION F THE REVENUE 
ACT OF 1978, at 225 (Comm. Print 1979). 
A bill has been introduced in the House that would delay the effective date until 1982. 
H.R. 5505, § 12(e), 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. H9899, H9901 (daily ed.Oct. 30, 
1979). 
7. Pollock v. Farmer's LOAN & TRUST CO., 157 U.S. 429, rehearing, 158 US.  601 
(1895). "That decision is only one of many that make constitutional law an easy route to 
an enviable reputation for critical scholarship." L. EISENSTEIN, THE IDEOLOGIES OF 
TAXATION 18 (1961). 
8. Act of Aug. 5, 1909, ch. 6, 8 38, 36 Stat. 112 (repealed 1913). 
9. See, e.g., Spreckels Sugar Ref. Co. v. McClain, 192 U S .  397, 412-13 (1904). 
10. 220 U.S. 107 (1911). 
11. Id. at 151-52. 
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Now that the sixteenth amendment has buried the appor- 
tionment bugaboo as to levies on income, we openly call the sec- 
tion Ill2 corporate exaction an income tax. However, considera- 
tion of the tax's incidence and the implications thereof gives sub- 
stantial cause for concluding that Congress was closer to the truth 
in 1909 when it used the title "special excise tax." 
The question of who ultimately bears the corporate income 
tax remains frustratingly resistant to a precise answer; but this 
much is clear-the tax is not borne by those legal entities called 
corporations. Its burden rests on some or all of the following in 
unknown proportions: investors through a lower rate of return, 
employees through lower compensation, and consumers through 
higher prices for goods and services.13 
The foregoing points are significant because an income tax 
is ordinarily conceived of as a system for defining the taxable 
income of the taxpayers and imposing a set of rates, usually rates 
that rise as taxpayer income increases. The minimum objective, 
often missed, is to tax equal amounts of income equally. The 
section 11 corporate tax does not fit within this conception of an 
income tax. Since the incidence of the corporate tax cannot be 
determined with any precision, its progressive rates" cannot be 
correlated with the income levels of the ultimate payors. Even if 
it could be established that the corporate level tax was borne 
entirely by shareholders, it seems impossible to construct such a 
tax with generally applicable progressive rates that would corre- 
spond with the varying income levels of individual shareholders. 
And even if the tax were imposed as a single rate levy, with the 
individual income tax following the same pattern, our uncer- 
tainty over the extent to which the corporate tax was ultimately 
being borne by incomes below the exemption levels of the individ- 
ual income tax would prevent assurance that the section 11 tax 
conformed to ability-to-pay notions. l5 
12. I.R.C. 9 11. 
13. J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 106, 111-15 (rev. ed. 1971); U.S. DEP'T OF THE 
TREASURY, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM 4 (1977); Klein, The Incidence Of The 
Corporation Income Tax: A Lawyer's View Of A Problem In Economics, 1965 WIS. L. REV. 
576. 
14. The § 11 tax now has five graduated rate brackets. 
15. TAX POLICY AND TAX REFORM: 1961-1969, at 662 (W. Helmuth & 0 .  Oldman eds. 
1973) (testimony of Stanley S. Surrey to the Committee on Ways and Means); U.S. DEP'T 
OF THE TREASURY, supra note 13,'at 68; Goode, Corporation Income Tax Rates, in STAW 
OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM 2281,2285 (Comm. Print 
1959); McLure, Integration of the Personal and Corporate Income Tax: The Missing 
Element in Recent Tax Reform Proposals, 88 HARV. L. REV. 532, 539 (1975). 
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The corporate tax is simply not an income tax in the same ' 
sense as the section 116 individual income tax. The corporate tax 
has been blended into the income tax portions of the Internal 
Revenue Code; but that is the result of historical drafting deci- 
sions, not the result of the nature of the levy. The corporate 
-income tax is what it was originally styled in 1909-an excise on 
doing business in corporate form." 
111. WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE NOL CARRYOVER 
IN THE CORPORATE INCOME TAX? 
The section 17218 NOL mechanism is commonly considered 
an averaging device for mitigating discrimination between tax- 
payers with both positive and negative income years in a given 
time period and taxpayers who have the same net income as the 
former group over the same time period but who receive it in level 
amounts without loss years.lg The following is a representative 
statement of this view: 
[Llosses incurred in business now can be carried back20 to the 
three years preceding the loss year, and then forward for the 
seven succeeding years, as a deduction from the positive income 
of each of those prior or subsequent periods. In effect, an eleven- 
year span is covered if one includes the loss year itself. Compa- 
nies which experience fluctuating profits and losses-say 'a $500 
net operating loss in Year 1 followed by $1,000 of profit in Year 
2-are thus treated the same in overall terms as companies with 
a flat income stream, that is, with $250 of profit in both years. 
Since interperiod loss-offsets are important to an equitable tax 
system, most would agree that the averaging period should be 
limited only by considerations of administrative fea~ibility.~' 
This quotation accurately describes the effect of section 172 
on individuals. In the individual income tax, section 172 directly 
16. I.R.C. 8 1. 
17. For an econometric study reaching the same conclusion, see Harberger, The Cor- 
poration Income Tax: An Empirical Appraisal, in STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND 
MEANS, TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM 231, 232, 239 (Comm. Print 1959). 
18. I.R.C. § 172. 
19. See, e.g., Treasury Department Report on "Business Loss Offsets" (Oct. 1947), 
in 1 S. SURREY, W. WARREN, P. MCDANIEL & H. AULT, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 769,770 
(1972). 
20. This Article does not discuss the carryback feature of 8 172 because NOL carry- 
backs are not § 381(c) items. For a proposal as to the survivability of NOL carrybacks, 
see Metzer, An Effective Use of Plain English-The Evolution and Impact of Section 
368(a)(l)(F), 32 TAX LAW. 703, 740-44 (1979). ' 
21. M. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATSON 199-200 (2d. ed. 1979). 
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, mitigates discrimination between taxpayers with level incomes 
and taxpayers with both gain and loss years by averaging the 
incomes of the latter group. Since the section 1 tax on the busi- 
ness incomes of individuals is borne by them and not shifted to 
others,22 the taxpayers who directly benefit from section 172 in the 
individual income tax are those who suffered loss and who then 
would have had to pay higher taxes in the carryforward years but 
for section 172. 
Matters are significantly different with respect to the section 
11 tax. Section 172 also averages income in the corporate income 
tax, but only at the corporate level. The effects must then filter 
through the corporation to the ultimate payors of the section 11 
tax. But because these ultimate payors may be changing daily, 
with the result that many who are investors, employees, or cus- 
tomers of a given corporation at the end of the carryforward pe- 
riod may not have been such at the time of loss or beginning of 
the carryforward period, the primary role of section 172 in the 
corporate tax cannot be averaging the incomes of the ultimate 
payors .23 
-- - 
22. R. GOODE, THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX 60 (rev. ed. 1976); J. PECHMAN & B. OKNER, 
WHO BEARS THE TAX BURDEN? 25, 30, 37 (1974). 
23. For this reason, conclusions herein are not based on an assertion that a corporate 
NOL carryover is an asset which "belongs" directly to any particular group of ultimate 
payors of the Q 11 tax. See note 25 infra. This raises the question of whether 4 172 should 
be applicable to the Q 11 tax at all. Analysis of the issue from the standpoint of sharehold- 
ers cuts both ways. 
For some shareholders, the corporate tax may produce increased burdens on corporate 
equity investment income, thus resulting in discrimination against the conduct of busi- 
ness in corporate form and in other related e~onomic distortions. See J. PECHMAN, supra 
note 13, at 120-21; U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 13, a t  68-69. Since 4 172 
mitigates these inequities and distortions by lowering the burden of the § 11 tax, this 
analysis indicates that Q 172 should continue to be applicable to the corporate tax. 
However, the § 11 tax confers a 46% maximum rate plus the opportunity to realize 
corporate earnings on a deferred basis at the shareholder level in the form of increased 
stock values taxed as capital gain. For some shareholders, this combination results in 
corporate investment income being taxed more lightly than other investment income. See 
McLure, supra note 15, a t  537-42. As to these shareholders, the corporate income tax 
creates discrimination in favor of the corporate form and may produce related economic 
distortions. Since Q 172 has the effect of lowering the 6 11 tax burden, it exacerbates the 
discrimination in this case and increases any accompanying economic distortions. Elimi- 
nation of Q 172 from the corporate income tax is thus indicated under this line of argu- 
ment. 
This Article assumes that in spite of the foregoing conflict, Q 172 will continue to be 
part of the 5 11 tax. There seems to be no serious pressure to the contrary. 
The presence of Q 172 in the Q 11 tax has been rationalized as a needed subsidy to 
business. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 855, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1939-2 C.B. 504, 
510-11. This approach, however, involves the complicated questions of whether corporate 
business should have a subsidy and of the relative advantages and disadvantages of tax 
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Having decided what the primary role of the corporate NOL 
carryover is not, we must now determine what it is. That matter 
can best be resolved by examining the principal effect of NOL 
carryovers in the corporate income tax. A corporation's carryover 
accomplishes a reduction in the corporation's section 11 tax for 
future years.24 It has the effect of a corporate level excise tax 
prepayment which can be recouped from the tax liability of later 
periods. Viewed in this manner, a corporate NOL carryover is a 
prepaid business expense that, for purposes of determining the 
extent to which it survives a transfer of the corporation's assets 
or stock, should be analyzed like a corporate prepayment of util- 
ity bills or other current business costs. 
IV. A RATIONALE FOR SECTION 382 
Assume X Corporation carries on its books a prepayment of 
its electricity bill and an unused NOL carryover. If X is sold to a 
third party, whether the sale is taxable or tax free or whether the 
sale is a stock or asset transaction, the consideration should be 
adjusted upward to reflect the electricity prepayment. This item 
is clearly a corporate asset for which the shareholders would 
rightly expect compen~at ion .~~ Should the NOL carryover be 
treated any differently once it is seen to be primarily a prepaid 
corporate excise tax?26 Shouldn't it be freely transferable like 
other corporate assets without running the gauntlet of section 
382? 
expenditures-matters far beyond the scope of this Article. See Surrey, Tax incentives as 
a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government 
Expenditures, 83 HAW. L. REV. 705 (1970). 
24. Since the carryover is a deduction, the amount of tax reduction is less than the 
amount of the carryover and will depend upon the corporation's marginal rate for each 
carryover year. 
25. The fact that the purchaser would not be able to deduct for income tax purposes 
the portion of the purchase price allocable to the prepayment or that there night be tax 
accounting problems with respect to the prepayment a t  the corporate level is irrelevant. 
The relevant considerations are that the prepayment will offset future electricity charges 
to the economic benefit of the purchaser and that the purchaser will be expected to pay 
the shareholders for this benefit because they control it. 
26. Granted, the superficial issue here is whether the corporate NOL carryover should 
survive the transaction and continue to be deductible for the economic benefit of the 
purchaser. But the real issue is whether X Corporation's shareholders can get compen- 
sated for this prepaid expense item. The only way in which the benefit of the corporate 
NOL carryover can be realized as a prepayment of excise tax is through deducting the 
NOL from the 5 11 excise tax base in future years. Thus, the purchaser will not be willing 
to compensate the X shareholders for this item unless assured of continued deductibility. 
Therefore, the question of deductibility after purchase is really a question of whether the 
shareholders will be allowed to sell the asset as part of the purchase transaction. 
Note that this Article is not arguing that a corporate NOL carryover should be 
transferable other than in connection with a preservation transaction as described in the 
text accompanying notes 1-2 supra. 
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Various reasons have been advanced for answering this last 
question negatively. One commentator recently stated that the 
"major flaw" in suggesting that corporate NOL carryovers should 
be freely transferable "is that it totally distorts the purpose of the 
loss carryover provision," which, the commentator asserts, "was 
designed to average out the profits and losses of the taxpayer and 
not those of different  taxpayer^."^^ However, as noted above, sec- 
tion 172 does not play the direct income averaging role for the 
ultimate payors of the section 11 tax that it plays for the individ- 
ual income taxpayer. Since the corporate NOL carryover has only 
an indirect and often negligible averaging effect on those who 
bear the corporate income tax, it seems better to characterize it 
according to its primary effect-a prepayment of a corporate ex- 
cise tax. 
It has also been suggested that the folly of free trade in corpo- 
rate NOL carryovers would become more apparent if the matter 
were analyzed in terms of direct government subsidies. This argu- 
ment has been made as follows: 
It may be observed that the whole question of the transfer- 
ability of losses arises because of the mechanism used to give 
some tax recognition to net losses in the usual situation. If, for 
example, a subsidy payment had been the mechanism chosen, 
so that a direct government payment in the year of loss were 
made, no issue of transferability of loss carryovers would arise 
. . . . If outsiders would not benefit in . . . [this situation], 
should they be allowed to benefit under the loss carryforward 
mechani~rn?~~ 
The central premise of the foregoing suggestion is that " [i]f . . . 
a subsidy payment had been the mechanism chosen, so that a 
direct government payment in the year of loss were made, no 
issue of transferability of loss carryovers would arise." This state- 
ment is presumably an assertion that no one would think of per- 
mitting the loss corporation to anticipate receipt of its subsidy 
check by selling its subsidy claim to a third party for cash in 
advance. But is that so? If corporate management determines 
that present cash is worth more than a future subsidy check, 
there seems nothing wrong with allowing the corporation to re- 
27. Salem, Limitations on NOL, ITC and Other Carryovers: A Suggested Reform of 
the 1976 Reform, 36 N.Y.U. TAX INST. 815, 824 (1978). 
28. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL INCOME, ESTATE AND GIFT TAX STAT- 
UTE-INCOME TAX PROBLEMS OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS-REPORT FO  1957-58, at 
47 (1958). 
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ceive its subsidy through a present discounted sale rather than 
waiting for the Treasury's draft.2Unalysis of the corporate NOL 
carryover in subsidy terms seems only to strengthen the free trade 
argument .30 
It has been also asserted that since we would be intuitively 
outraged if individuals were allowed to sell deduction carryovers, 
we should be equally offended at the thought of corporations 
transferring NOL carry over^.^^ That assertion involves a non se- 
quitur. To the extent deduction carryovers are incorporated in the 
individual income tax to produce a more equitable income defini- 
tion for the taxpayers generating the deductions, they should not 
be transferable to other taxpayers. To permit transfer would de- 
feat the purpose of the carryover. But for reasons given above,32 
the corporate NOL carryover's primary purpose cannot be to pro- 
duce a more equitable definition of the incomes of those who 
ultimately bear the tax. Thus, the fact that income-defining car- 
ryovers in the individual income tax should be nontransferable 
does not require nontransferability of the corporate NOL carry- 
over. Moreover, to the extent that a deduction carryover is 
granted for subsidy purposes in the individual income tax, analy- 
sis in the preceding paragraph indicates that it would not be 
outrageous to allow individuals to sell such a carryover. 
Another attack is based on the assertion that free trade 
would give corporate NOL carryover buyers an unacceptable 
windfall since the price paid will usually be a fraction of the 
carryover's worth. The following is a prominent statement of this 
view: 
[Flree traffic in loss offsets would mean large windfalls for 
buyers. Thus, in situations where today a net loss can legally be 
29. Granted, such a sale may be illegal under present law. See 31 U.S.C. 4 203 (1976); 
Korbel, The Anti-Assignment Statute in the Tax Field: A Trap for the Unwary Practi- 
tioner, 18 TAX L. REV. 473 (1963). However, Congress can easily remove this obstacle 
with an appropriate amendment. Furthermore, 6 203 is based on considerations of admin- 
istrative convenience and prevention of fraud. Patterson v. United States, 354 F.2d 327, 
329 (Ct. C1. 1965). Thus, it is irrelevant to the issue of whether free transferability of NOL 
carryovers represents sound tax policy. 
30. This analysis also argxes for repeal of the limitation on certain subsidy carryovers 
contained in I.R.C. 6 383. 
31. "If one taxpayer who had medical expenses which he could not deduct were to 
transfer those deductions, for a price, to another taxpayer who could take advantage of' 
them on his income tax return, it would be a shocking thing. In principle, trafficking in 
net operating losses is no different." Tax Reform Act of 1975: Hearings on H.R. 106'12 
Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3286 (1976) (statement of 
Michael Waris, Jr.). 
32. See text accompanying notes 18-23 supra. 
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obtained on the purchase of a corporation, according to the ob- 
servations of some practitioners loss positions have been ac- 
quired for 10 to 15 cents on the dollar or less. A considerable 
windfall is thus present, since one dollar paid may bring up to 
five dollars of tax benefit. Even if restrictions were removed, 
buyers would still be able to purchase the losses at considerable 
discounts because of the weak bargaining positions of the sellers 
and the general business risks faced by buyers. The basic con- 
cern, in this light, would be that of cutting down on the ability 
of buyers to obtain these tax windfalls, rather than that of fur- 
nishing tax relief to sellers.33 
There is a strong probability, however, that the low price for 
carryovers results from the presence of sections 26934 and 382. 
These sections do not create total nontransferability but do pro- 
duce considerable d h b t  as to whether a given buyer will get full 
use of an NOL carryover. In that situation it is perfectly reason- 
able to find buyers paying heavily discounted prices.35 The inevi- 
table result is that buyers who successfully penetrate sections 269 
and 382 reap substantial windfalls. If our concern is to mitigate 
this windfall feature, making section 382 more rigorous is not the 
indisputable answer. A perfectly rational course would be to 
make NOL carryovers freely transferable and thus remove the 
discount arising from uncertainty. The extent to which buyers 
would still be able to command discounts because of distress 
33. ALI PROJECT, supra note 3, a t  341-42. 
34. I.R.C. § 269(a) provides: 
(a) IN GENERAL.-If- 
(1) any person or persons acquire, or acquired on or after October 
8, 1940, directly or indirectly, control of a corporation, or 
(2) any corporation acquires, or acquired on or after October 8, 
1940, directly or indirectly, property of another corporation, not con- 
trolled, directly or indirectly, immediately before such acquisition, by 
such acquiring corporation or its stockholders, the basis of which prop- 
erty, in the hands of the acquiring corporation, is determined by refer- 
ence to the basis in the hands of transferor corporation, 
and the principal purpose for which such acquisition was made is evasion or 
avoidance of Federal income tax by securing the benefit of a deduction, credit, 
or other allowance which such person or corporation would not otherwise enjoy, 
then the Secretary may disallow such deduction, credit, or other allowance. For 
purposes of paragraphs (1) and (2), control means the ownership of stock pos- 
sessing a t  least 50 percent of the total combined voting power of all classes of 
stock entitled to vote or a t  least 50 percent of the total value of shares of all 
classes of stock of the corporation. 
35. ALI PROJECT, supra note 3, a t  339; Aidinoff, Utilization of Acquired Net Operat- 
ing Loss Carryovers and the Tax Reform Act of 1976-A Face-Lift for Section 382, 55 
TAXES 874, 887 (1977). 
2131 SECTION 382 223 
positions of sellers under this alternative would result from the 
business reality that distress sales of any item usually bring a 
lower price unless there is a free and active market to minimize 
the distress element.36 
The only compelling argument against free trade in corporate 
NOL carryovers is one of practical politics. If the national con- 
science is not offended by free trade in utility prepayments, it 
ought not to be outraged by trafficking in corporate NOL carry- 
over~.~' However, public attitudes are matters of fact, not reason; 
and there is considerable evidence that Americans view corporate 
NOL carryovers as being different from utility prepayments re- 
gardless of whether to do so is rational. This point has been stated 
as follows: 
[Tlhis view of freedom to sell loss offsets . . . does appear to 
many as partaking of tax immorality. It would be difficult to 
rationalize as a bona fide and regular part of the business world 
the acceptance of the methodical purchase and sale of corporate 
shells because of their loss offsets . . . . 38 
Thus it appears necessary to limit the transferability of corporate 
NOL carryovers in order to foster within the public the feelings 
of confidence and goodwill essential to sustaining a self- 
assessment income tax system.39 
This observation leads to troubling conclusion for those en- 
36. This is as good a place as any to state that restrictions on transfers of corporate 
NOL canyovers have been advocated as inhibitors of undesirable economic concentration. 
ALI PROJECT, supra note 3, at  342. But there is an effective rebuttal to this argument: 
[I]t seems unlikely that a revenue act can be adequately selective by its terms 
to encourage the reorganizations which will result in growth, and to discourage 
those which will have monopolistic or other economically unfortunate tenden- 
cies . . . . [I]t would seem better to obtain enforcement of the antitrust and 
related statutes by reliance upon those agencies of Government which are re- 
sponsible in that area and which presumably can make intelligent differentia- 
tion between transactions according to standards relevant to the statutes they 
are charged with administering and enforcing. 
Brown, An Approach to Subschapter C, in STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 
TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM 1619, 1622 (Comm. Print 1959). 
37. The foregoing analysis also indicates that the principal purpose for which a busi- 
ness combination was effected should have no bearing on the survivability of an NOL 
carryover (except to the extent preservation depends on the combination transaction being 
treated as a tax-free reorganization so that the business purpose requirement is applicable, 
(Treas. Reg. 6 1.368-1(c) (1955)) and that $269 should be inapplicable to the preservation 
issue. 
38. ALI PROJECT, supra note 3, a t  341. 
39. An alternative would be an attempt by the business community to create a 
favorable public attitude concerning free trade in corporate NOL carryovers. The chance 
of success seems slim. 
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amored with logical solutions.40 It suggests that all attempts to 
produce a section 382 flowing harmoniously from the structure 
and assumptions of the income tax or embodying some external 
standard derived from reason as to when corporate NOL carry- 
overs should be transferable are fruitless. There is nothing inher- 
ent in the nature of the section 11 tax or in logic which requires 
limitations on the transferability of corporate NOL carryovers. 
The "reform" of section 382 is a sociopolitical problem. The limi- 
tations on survivability of NOL carryovers lack a firm basis in 
logic. They have been imposed because of the political demands 
of noncorporate taxpayers. This suggests that the objective or 
rationale of any section 382 revision must be the creation of limi- 
tations that go far enough to satisfy the great body of "ordinary" 
taxpayers while doing as little damage as possible to the orderly 
progress of commerce.41 
The 1976 Tax Reform Act (TRA) version of section 382 fails 
this standard. It increases the difficulty of transferring corporate 
NOL carryovers and the complexity and uncertainty of the law 
without any hard evidence of public demand for change.42 A move 
in the direction of pre-1976 law would be ap~ropr ia te .~~  
Congress should not totally return to the pre-1976 version of 
section 382, however. For instance, the business continuation 
ruled4 of old section 382(a) had the potential for inhibiting the 
purchasers of a failing business from restructuring it.45 Elimina- 
tion of this rule by the 1976 TRA was sound. But since removal 
of the business continuation rule makes the law more stringent 
when increased rigor is not desired, some mitigating tradeoff is 
needed. An appropriate solution would be to change the 50% rule 
of old section 382(a) to an 80% rule, while returning to the old 20% 
- 
40. It also irritates lawyers and academicians by diminishing the importance of their 
expertise. 
41. This suggestion that the proper structure of # 382 is a political question is not a 
radical view. Questions as fundamental to our income tax system as whether it should be 
.progressive and how progressive should it be are matters which can be ultimately resolved 
only by reference to the political process. See L. EISENSTEIN, THE IDEOLOGIES OF TAXATION 
33 (1961). 
42. See Aidinoff, supra note 35, at 886-87; Salem, supra note 27, at 81'5, 819. 
43. Since there was never any significant evidence of public concern regarding I.R.C. 
$ 383 carryover items, that provision, which applies # 382 restrictions to certain corporate 
tax credits, foreign taxes, and capital losses, could well be abolished. 
44. See note 4 supra. 
45. ALI PROJECT, supra note 3, a t  339; Salem, supra note 27, at 825-26. 
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rule in the case of section 382(b).46 This would balance the loss of 
the advantages of the business continuation rule of section 382(a), 
move back towards the principal features of the pre-1976 law, and 
create consistency between the percentage tests of sections 382(a) 
and (b). 
The old section 382(a) was also objectionable in that a min- 
ute encroachment on its percentage test could result in the com- 
plete loss of the NOL carryover. The graduated "scale down" 
concept of the new section 382(a)(2) is an improvement that 
should be retained. 
The new section 382 removes Libson Shops, Inc. v. KoehlerJ7 
from the law applicable to corporate NOL carry over^.^^ Internal 
Revenue Service concessions had left Libson Shops with only 
limited viability anyway,49 and eradication of the remainder of its 
uncertain reach will add something to the law's certainty") with- 
out a major change in coverage. This feature of the 1976 TRA 
should be retained. 
Finally, the legislative history of the new section 382 reduces 
the influence of section 269 on transferability of corporate NOL 
carryovers but does so in language that makes the extent of the 
reduction ~ncer ta in .~ '  Although its potency has increased in re- 
- - p-- 
46. As originally passed, 8 382(b) "was applicable only to changes of ownership 
through a tax-free reorganization, under which the carryover [was] reduced proportion- 
ately if the old owners receive[d] less than 20 percent of the stock of the reorganized 
corporation and [was] eliminated if they received none." B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra 
note 2, 7 16.22, at 16-54. The 1976 TRA increased the 20% figure to 40%. Id. 8 16.24, a t  
16-74. 
47. 353 U.S. 382 (1957). In Libson Shops 16 separately incorporated retail stores were 
merged into a single corporation. Three of the premerger corporations had NOL carryovers 
which the postmerger corporation wished to offset against its postmerger profits. The 
retail activities of the three corporations which had generated the NOL carryovers contin- 
ued to be unprofitable after the merger. Consequently, the only postmerger income from 
which the carryovers could be deducted was that produced by the 13 profitable operations. 
The Supreme Court concluded that "petitioner is not entitled to a carry-over since the 
income against which the offset is claimed was not produced by substantially the same 
businesses which incurred the losses." Id. at 390. The meaning and reach of this decision 
have never been adequately clarified. See generally B. B ~ K E R  & J. EUSTICE, supra note 
2, 7 16.26. 
48. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 94TH CONG., 2~ SESS., GENERAL EXPLANATION 
OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976, at 202 (Comm. Print 1976). 
49. See Rev. Rul. 63-40, 1963-1 C.B. 46; Rev. Rul. 58-603,1958-2 C.B. 147; IRS Tech. 
Info. Release No. 773 (Oct. 13, 1965). 
50. See B. BITTKER & J.  EUSTICE, supra note 2, 11 16.26, a t  16-94 to -95. 
51. S. REP. NO. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 206, reprinted in [I9761 U.S. CODE CONG. 
& AD. NEWS 3439, 3638: 
The Committee has not amended section 269 of present law because the 
application of this general disallowance provision should be retained for transac- 
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cent years, section 269 has historically not been a major weapon 
against transfers of corporate NOL carry over^.^^ Nevertheless, it 
adds an element of unpredictability to tax planning for corporate 
acquisition transactions. If Congress excised the remainder of sec- 
tion 269 from this area, it would make the law more certain with- 
out removing a major historical barrier. 
The political rationale suggested earlier for section 382 can 
certainly be served by statutory configurations different from the 
one given above. However, a return to old section 382 with the 
foregoing modifications would satisfy the political rationale while 
resulting in a provision with contours similar to those which tax- 
payers and practitioners have learned to live with since 1954. 
tions not expressly within the fixed rules as changed by the amendment. Section 
269 is retained, for example, to deal with "built-in loss" transactions and other 
exchanges or transfers which are apparent devices to exploit continuing gaps in 
the technical rules for tax avoidance purposes. The committee believes, how- 
ever, that section 269 should not be applied to disallow net operating loss carry- 
overs in situations where part or all of a loss carryover is permitted under the 
specific rules in section 382, unless a device or scheme to circumvent the purpose 
of the carryover restrictions appears to be present. 
52. ALI PROJECT, supm note 3, at 345; B.  men & J. E u s n c ~ ,  supra note 2, I/ 16.21, 
at 16-45 to -46, 1 16.22, at 16-53. 
